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et al.: Speedy Trial Protection for Indiana Criminal Defendants Under Ind

NOTES
SPEEDY TRIAL PROTECTION FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS UNDER INDIANA'S AMENDED
CRIMINAL RULE 4
INTRODUCTION

A defendant's right to a speedy trial on a criminal charge is
fundamental to Anglo-American jurisprudence.' A speedy trial is
guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. ' The United States Supreme Court has declared this portion
of the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment;3 in addition, each of the fifty states guarantees
the right to a speedy trial to its citizens.4 Indiana Criminal Rule 45
is one of many state statutes which attempts to provide a definitive
safeguard of this right.
The purpose of this note is to examine the recently amended
CR 4 in light of the problems courts have encountered in interpreting the rule's predecessors. The examination will isolate and criticize the changes made in the new rule as well as suggest further
solutions to the interpretive questions which remain. Thus, the note
will seek to serve as a guide to readers unfamiliar with CR 4, an aid
to attorneys and courts who are called upon to use or interpret the
existing rule and a source of suggestions to committee members and
legislators contemplating further change of the rule.
After CR 4 has been presented and its history has been traced,
the purpose of the rule will be delineated. With this purpose as a
touchstone, various problems and questions will be met and answered. First, the listed exceptions to CR 4 will be explained and
the validity of each will be measured. Second, the method for determining the rule's specified time period will be analyzed. In conjunction with that determination, the applicability of CR 4 to
1. In Klop/er v. North Carolina,386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967), the Supreme Court refers to
a recognition of the right to speedy justice in the Assize of Clarendon, 1166.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial
....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. 386 U.S. at 223.
4. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377 (1969).
5. IND. R. CRIM. P. 4 [hereinafter cited in the text as CR 4].
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defendants incarcerated on other offenses will be clarified. Third,
the necessity of demand requirements under the rule will be explored. Finally, the assignment of the burden of establishing cause
of delay will be examined.

CR 4 IN

PERSPECTIVE

CR 4 must be seen in its entirety in order to appreciate the
problems that courts have experienced in the specific application of
the rule's predecessors. In stating the rule and briefly outlining its
historical development, this section will provide the background for
that perspective.
CR 4 Stated
Indiana Criminal Rule 4 declares that one accused of a crime
is to be released on his own recognizance if incarcerated without a
trial for an aggregate period exceeding six months from the date he
was charged or arrested.' There are three exceptions to the operation
of this rule.' The first exception applies to those instances in which
a defendant successfully makes a motion for a continuance. The
second exception applies when the delay in the trial is caused by the
defendant's act. The third listed exception becomes applicable
when a trial cannot be held during the statutory period because of
a congested court calendar. A prerequisite for this final exception
requires the prosecutor to request a continuance in the trial. The
prosecutor's motion for such continuance must be made at least ten
days prior to the trial date and must allege a congested court calendar as grounds for the motion. If such motion is made within the
ten-day period prior to the trial date, the prosecutor must also demonstrate that he was free from fault in causing the delay.'
6. IND. R. CRIM. P. 4(A) provides that
[no defendant shall be detained in jail on a charge, without a trial, for a period in
aggregate embracing more than six [6] months from the date the criminal charge
against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge (whichever is later).
7. INn. R. CRIM. P. 4(A) provides exceptions
where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or
where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar.
8. IND. R. CRIM. P. 4(A) provides
that in the last-mentioned circumstances, the prosecuting attorney shall make such
statement in a motion for continuance not later than ten [101 days prior to the date
set for trial, or if such motion is filed less than ten [10] days prior to trial, the
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A procedure is provided by which an accused detained in jail
pending trial may file a motion for an early trial? If an incarcerated
defendant makes such a motion,' 0 he is entitled to trial within fifty
judicial days. If his trial is not commenced within that time and
none of the three conditions of exception mentioned above is present, the defendant is entitled to discharge."
CR 4 further provides for defendants released on recognizance
or bail.' An accused must be tried within one year from the date
that a charge was filed against him or the date he was arrested,
whichever occurs later. The only instances in which the operation
of this provision is defeated are the three exceptions referred to
above in conjunction with an incarcerated defendant. 3 In cases
where any one of these three exceptions is present, the rule's time
limitations are tolled." The applicable period resumes counting
only after the intervening delay has terminated. Where delay occurs
during the final thirty days of any CR 4 trial time limitation and
such delay was caused by the defendant's act, the prosecution may
petition the trial court for an additional thirty-day extension in
which to try the defendant.'"
prosecuting attorney shall show additionally that the delay in filing the motion was
not the fault of the prosecutor.
9. INn. R. CRIM. P. 4(B) provides that
[ilf any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an
early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within fifty [501 judicial
days from the date of such motion, except where a continuance within said period is
had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was
not sufficient time to try him during such fifty [50] judicial days because of the
congestion of the court calendar. Provided, however, that in the last mentioned
circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as
under subdivision (A) of this rule.
, 278 N.E.2d 583 (1972).

10.

See Gross v. State,

11.

See note 9 supra.

12.

IND. R. CRIM. P. 4(C) provides that

__

Ind. -

Inmo person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge
for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal
charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge,
whichever is later.
13. IND. R. CRIM. P. 4(C) concludes by saying that "[ainy defendant so held shall, on
motion, be discharged."
14. IND. R. CRIM. P. 4(F) states that
Iwihen a continuance is had on motion of the defendant, or delay in trial is caused
by his act, any time limitation contained in this rule shall be extended by the amount
of the resulting period of such delay caused thereby.
15. IND. R. CRIM. P. 4(F) concludes by stating that
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When present, one other special set of circumstances may extend the six-months, fifty-judicial days and one-year time periods
specified in CR 4. At the time an accused makes a motion for discharge, the trial court may continue the cause for ninety days provided three criteria are established: first, there exists evidence
which the state has not been able to secure; second, the state has
made a reasonable effort to obtain the evidence; third, the trial
court has good reason to believe that the state will be able to procure
the evidence within ninety days. If the defendant has not received
a trial at the end of this ninety-day extension, he is to be discharged.' 6
A CR 4 discharge effectively bars a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense.' 7 While the courts have emphasized that the discharge is not an acquittal in that it does not determine a defendant's
guilt or innocence,"6 such discharge stands in the record as if the
defendant had been acquitted." In that sense, the order granting a
discharge is a final judgment in the cause.20
Historical Outline of CR 4
Indiana's original discharge statute was enacted in 1881.1 As
the predecessor of CR 4, its form was substantially the same as the
if the defendant causes any such delay during the last thirty [30] days of any period
of time set by operation of this rule, the State may petition the trial court for an
extension of such period for an additional thirty [30] days.
16. IND. R. CRIM. P. 4(D) provides that
[ilf when application is made for discharge of a defendant under this rule, the court
be satisfied that there is evidence for the state, which cannot then be had, that
reasonable effort has been made to procure the same and there is just ground to
believe that such evidence can be had within ninety [90] days, the cause may be
continued, and the prisoner remanded or admitted to bail; and if he be not brought
to trial by the state within such additional ninety [90] days, he shall then be
discharged.
17. McGuire v. Wallace, 109 Ind. 284, 10 N.E. 111 (1887); cf. State v. Taylor, 235 Ind.
632, 137 N.E.2d 537 (1956). A CR 4 discharge on an offense does not bar subsequent prosecution for a separate offense, even one arising out of the same transaction. Foreman v. State,
214 Ind. 79, 14 N.E.2d 546 (1938); accord, Kirk v. State, - Ind. __,
287 N.E.2d 334 (1972)
(a discharge is effective as to any lesser included offense charged under another count).
18. State v. Soucie, 234 Ind. 98, 123 N.E.2d 888 (1955).
19. State ex rel. Hasch v. Johnson Circuit Court, 234 Ind. 429, 127 N.E.2d 600 (1955);
State v. Gardner, 233 Ind. 557, 122 N.E.2d 77 (1954).
20. State v. Soucie, 234 Ind. 98, 123 N.E.2d 888 (1955).
21. Ch. 36, §§ 207-09, [1881] Ind. Acts 153.
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present rule.22 Some procedural changes, however, have been incor-

porated in the present rule.
A significant difference between CR 4 and the earlier discharge
statute is the manner in which the maximum time for trial is expressed. The original statute provided that a defendant was not to
be held on recognizance for "more than three terms."" The present
rule no longer speaks of "term" time; rather, under CR 4 "[n]o
defendant shall be held . . . for . . . more than one year."24 This

change from a specified number of terms to a specified number of
months effected a state-wide uniform application of the discharge
rule." Under the earlier statute, since the number of court terms
which were commenced each year varied from county to county,"
the degree of statutory protection varied accordingly. By eliminating any reference to the beginning and end of trial court terms, CR
4 guarantees a trial for all defendants within the same time period.
This guarantee also provides greater ease of administration than
that provided by the earlier statute.
A further difference between CR 4 and its predecessor is the
inclusion in the rule of a fifty-judicial day provision. 8 The older
discharge statute did not contain any provision comparable to CR
4(B), which requires trial within fifty judicial days for an incarcerated defendant who has made a motion for an early trial. This
22. It was reenacted in the Recodification Act of 1905, ch. 169, §§ 219-21, [1905] Ind.
Acts 584 (codified at Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 9-1402 to 1404 (repl. 1956)). In pertinent part, § 91403 provided that
[njo person shall be held by recognizance to answer an indictment or affidavit,
without trial, for a period embracing more than three [3] terms of court, not including the term at which a recognizance was first taken thereon, if taken in term time;
but he shall be discharged unless a continuance be bad upon his own motion, or the
delay be caused by his act, or there be not sufficient time to try him at such third
term.
23. Id.
24. See note 12 supra.
25. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]. The commentary to
section 2.1 notes that some speedy trial plans express time limits according to how many court
terms have elapsed. These are criticized as causing "lack of uniformity throughout a jurisdiction and being difficult for defendants and counsel to understand." Comment at 14.
26. Compare State v. Mabrey, 199 Ind. 276, 157 N.E. 97 (1927) (Monroe county had
four terms per year) with Palmer v. State, 198 Ind. 73, 152 N.E. 607 (1926) (Owen county
had two terms per year).
27. Callahan v. State, 247 Ind. 350, 214 N.E.2d 648, cert. denied 385 U.S. 942 (1966).
28. See note 9 supra.
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innovation in the rule serves two purposes. Its obvious function is
to provide the opportunity for an earlier trial for incarcerated defendants. It also serves, however, to negate the requirement of a demand for trial as a prerequisite to the operation of CR 4(A).11
PURPOSE OF

CR 4

Prior to the 1974 amendments, CR 4 was surrounded by problems relating to its interpretation and application. These problems
included a determination of the method to be used in counting the
rule's time requirements, the application of the rule to defendants
in jail on a different offense, the demand required by the rule, and
with whom the burden of proof should reside in a discharge hearing.
A proper understanding of these problems and the extent to which
they have been effectively alleviated by the rule's recent amendments requires an examination of the purpose of CR 4.
The Indiana Supreme Court has enumerated three possible
purposes for CR 4. One view describes the rule as a practical implementation of the Indiana Constitution. A second view suggests that
CR 4 serves to prod the prosecution into trying a case promptly.
According to the third view the purpose of CR 4 is to bring the
defendant to trial within the stated period of time, provided that the
rule's exceptions do not apply. While all three propositions are accurate, the emphasis should be placed on the third view mentioned.
CR 4: Implementation of the Constitution
The Indiana Supreme Court has often expressed the purpose of
CR 4 as being a "practical implementation" of Article 1, Section 12
of the Indiana Constitution.30 This section provides in pertinent part
that "U]ustice shall be administered . . . speedily, and without
delay." 3' Expressing the rule's purpose in terms of the speedy trial
right guaranteed by the constitution, however, fails to provide a
definitive guide in the application of the rule. Resort to the constitution does not clarify difficult situations governed by CR 4.
That reference to the Indiana Constitution does not provide
29. See notes 144-46 infra and accompanying text.
30. Johnson v. State, 252 Ind. 70, 245 N.E.2d 659 (1969); State exrel. Hasch v. Johnson
Circuit Court, 234 Ind. 429, 127 N.E.2d 600 (1955); Liese v. State, 233 Ind. 250, 118 N.E.2d
731 (1954).
31. IND. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1891).
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valuable assistance in solving discharge problems is demonstrated
by State v. Beckwith." In that case the clerk's entry book indicated
the amount of defendants' bail, but no further entry of any court
proceedings occurred until a new judge assumed office six months
later. After four additional months had expired, each defendant
filed a motion for discharge. The trial judge sustained the motions.
On the state's appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision due to lack of evidence concerning the time that the
defendants were released on bail. 33 While holding that the defendants had failed to present the necessary proof to bring them within
the terms of the statute, the supreme court felt a "duty to affirm
the judgment if regardless of the statute the special judge reached
the correct conclusion. '34 In turning to the question of reasonable
time, as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights beyond which the trial of
an accused may not be delayed, the Beckwith court stated that "no
Indiana case which we have been able to find disposes of the question."35 The words of the Indiana Constitution, "speedily and without delay," presented the court with only vague guidelines:
A speedy trial is, in general, one had as soon as the prosecution, with reasonable diligence can prepare for it;
Due allowance must be made for the delays which are a
natural incident to every criminal prosecution. These must
be regarded as reasonable. The guaranty is against unreasonable delay. 6
Applying this definition to the facts in Beckwith, the court did not
find sufficient facts from which to draw a conclusion that the trial
was unreasonably delayed.
The futility of seeking the aid of the constitution in measuring
the validity of a discharge claim can be seen in the language of the
Beckwith court. CR 4 encompasses within it the constitutional guarantee of a trial commenced "speedily and without delay,"37 but it
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
federally

222 Ind. 618, 57 N.E.2d 193 (1944).
Id. at 620, 57 N.E.2d at 194.
Id. at 623, 57 N.E.2d at 196.
Id.
Id., quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 467 (1936).
See note 31 supra. Nor does a consultation of the United States Constitution or
established speedy trial requirements provide more than vague minimum guidelines
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defines specifically the length of time beyond which a delay in trial
will not be permitted. Whether a delay is permitted under the rule
does not depend on whether it is a "natural incident" to criminal
proceedings in general, as dictated by the Beckwith definition of the
constitutional guarantee; CR 4 allows delay only if it is caused by
the defendant or a crowded court calendar.
CR 4: Penalty to the Prosecutor
The Indiana Supreme Court has also expressed the purpose of
the discharge rule as a limitation upon the right of the prosecutor
to hold the defendant for trial. 8 Under this view, a failure to bring
the defendant to trial within the statutory period results in a penfor CR 4 analysis. Prior to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United States Supreme
Court considered only single aspects of the speedy trial right. United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307 (1971) (three-year delay in the bringing of indictments); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S.
30 (1970) (state's failure to respond to defendant's request for speedy trial on state charge
when defendant was serving a federal sentence); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (similar
failure to respond to requests of a defendant serving a federal sentence); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (nolle prosequi of a charge by the state with leave to restore
the indictment at a later date); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) (dismissal of
earlier indictment relating to same charge was cause of delay in trial); Pollard v. United
States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957) (validity of sentence imposed after two-year delay); Beavers v.
Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905) (removal proceedings where defendant was charged on different
indictments); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd mern., 350 U.S. 857
(1955) (delay in defendant's trial caused by deliberate act of the government). The Barker
decision marked the first attempt by the Court to speak comprehensively to the entire speedy
trial question and delineate a single set of criteria by which the right is to be measured.
According to the Barker Court, four factors are to be considered in deciding a sixth
amendment speedy trial claim: the length of delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, the
reason for the delay and the prejudice to the defendant. By use of a balancing test, these
factors are to be considered along with other relevant circumstances. 407 U.S. at 530. What
the Barker Court expressly declined to do was "hold that the Constitution requires a criminal
defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period." Id. at 523. The Court did
realize that specification of a time limit would remove much of the difficulty courts experience in deciding a speedy trial claim. However, finding no constitutional basis which would
allow this kind of judicial fiat, the Court instead chose a "less precise" approach. Id.
CR 4 does specifically state time periods beyond which a defendant's trial cannot be
delayed. Subject only to its own exceptions, the rule requires discharge after one year for a
defendant on recognizance and after fifty judicial days for an incarcerated defendant who
makes a demand for an early trial. As recently expressed by the Indiana Supreme Court in
Fosse, v. State, 254 Ind. 173, 258 N.E.2d 616 (1970):
Quite obviously, the standard imposed on Indiana courts and prosecutors is stricter
than that imposed in the federal system since any delay exceeding the specified limit
is considered a per se denial of the "speedy trial" right.
Id. at 177, 258 N.E.2d at 618-19.
38. State v. Kuhn, 154 Ind. 450, 57 N.E.2d 106 (1900).
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alty to the prosecutor. The court in Weer v. State39 analyzed delays
caused by pleas in abatement and premature efforts by the defendant to effect a change of venue in these terms: "The state is not
answerable for these delays and the motion to discharge was properly overruled."4' This approach places too great an emphasis upon
the determination of whether or not the prosecutor was delinquent
in bringing the defendant to trial. Such an approach is not supported by the rule, since lack of delinquency in prosecution is not
one of the rule's listed exceptions. Thus, language such as that
found in Alyea v. State,4 ' wherein it was held that "[a]ny delay
incident to the taking of a change of venue by the defendant cannot
be discharged [sic] to the State,"4 is unnecessarily confusing.
What the court should have said is that the delay was or was not
chargeable to the defendant.
CR 4: Bring Defendant to Trial
The third view expressed by the Indiana Supreme Court is that
the purpose of the discharge rule is to bring the defendant to trial
within the statutory period, provided the trial is not delayed by his
act.4 3 The way in which a speedy trial claim is decided under this
view of the statute is demonstrated in Colglazier v. State.44 In that
case a defendant charged with reckless homicide posted a recognizance bond in January of 1951. During the March term of that year,
a special judge was qualified pursuant to the defendant's motion.
The prosecutor then filed a similar motion during the May term of
court. In attempting to qualify another judge, the trial court made
repeated errors, making it impossible to hold a trial until after the
November term of court had expired. As a result, even though the
delay was not directly attributable to the prosecutor, the statutory
limit passed before a trial of the case could be held. 5
The state contended that the delay in defendant's trial "was
caused by the court's error and could not be properly charged to the
state."4 6 Approaching the question with a "penalty to the prosecu39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787 (1941).
Id. at 220, 36 N.E.2d at 789.
198 Ind. 364, 152 N.E. 801 (1926).
Id. at 367, 152 N.E. at 801-02.
Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951).
231 Ind. 571, 110 N.E.2d 2 (1953).
Id. at 573, 110 N.E.2d at 3.
Id. at 575, 110 N.E.2d at 4.
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tor" analysis, the trial court agreed with the state and refused discharge. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed:
The Statute does not say that the person shall be discharged if his trial is delayed . . . by an act of the prosecutor, but does say that he (the person held) shall be
discharged unless a continuance be had upon his motion or
the delay caused by his act. It makes no difference whether
the delay is caused by the prosecutingattorney or the court,
so long as it is not caused by an act of the accused."
This view of the statute is supported by the plain words of the rule.
"No defendant shall be detained in jail. . . without a trial . . . for
• . .more than six months . . . except" where his acts, including
motions for continuance, delay the trial, or the congestion of the
court calendar causes delay. A CR 4 discharge is not expressed in
terms which grant the prosecutor the right to try the defendant so
long as the proecutor does not cause the delay. Rather, "any delay
exceeding the specified time limit is considered a per se denial of
the 'speedy trial' right."4 It is this positive right of the defendant
which CR 4 was designed to protect.
VIABILITY OF

CR 4

EXCEPTIONS

Positive protection of a defendant's speedy trial rights under
CR 4 can only be frustrated if one of the rule's express exceptions is
present. These exceptions must be examined in light of the rule's
purpose.
Delay Caused by Defendant's Act
If the purpose of the rule is to bring the defendant to trial so
long as he himself is not instrumental in preventing this, a provision
which reads "except where . . .the delay was caused by his act"4
is entirely consistent with this purpose. The defendant who causes
a delay in his trial is not necessarily saying that he "no longer wishes
to avail himself of the benefit" of CR 4, as one court said, 0 but by
his actions the defendant is making the realization of a speedy trial
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. (emphasis added).
Fossey v. State, 254 Ind. 173, 179, 258 N.E.2d 616, 619 (1970).
See note 7 supra.
Summerlin v. State, 256 Ind. 652, 666, 271 N.E.2d 411, 418 (1971).
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more difficult. This fact alone would seem to justify a retention of
this exception.
In identifying delays caused by the defendant, the courts have
applied the general rule that any motion made by the defendant is
to be included within this exception." Thus, when a defendant
makes a motion for a change of venue,"2 a motion for a change of
venue from the judge, 3 a motion for severance,54 a plea in abatement55 or where his plea of temporary insanity necessitates competency hearings, the delays which result are treated as defendantcaused delays. The same reasoning applies to a defendant who requests and receives a continuance.5 7 This situation, presently listed
as a separate exception" in the rule, could conveniently be handled
under the "delay caused by defendant's act" exception. Isolating
this particular type of delay simply emphasizes what is already
apparent-that the defendant is chargeable for the delay "where a
continuance was had on his motion."
Congested Court Calendar Exception
If the purpose of CR 4 were simply to prevent prosecutors from
delaying the trials of criminal defendants,59 the crowded court calendar exception to the rule might be consistent with that purpose. The
exception does conflict, however, with the spirit of CR 4-that a
defendant who has not been instrumental in causing delay must be
brought to trial within the time period specified in the rule. This
conflict was recognized in the early case of State v. Kuhn,'"decided
51. This general rule does not apply to a defendant's motion to quash. State v.
McCarty, 243 Ind. 361, 185 N.E.2d 732 (1962); Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d
203 (1951).
52. Norris v. State, 251 Ind. 155, 240 N.E.2d 45 (1968); Colglazier v. State, 231 Ind. 571,
110 N.E.2d 2 (1953); State v. Mabrey, 199 Ind, 276, 157 N.E. 97 (1927); Alyea v. State, 198
Ind. 364, 152 N.E. 801 (1926).
, 280 N.E.2d 307 (1972); State v. Grow, 255 Ind. 183,
53. Easton v. State, __ Ind.
263 N.E.2d 277 (1970); Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957).
54. State v. Hawley, 256 Ind. 244, 268 N.E.2d 80 (1971).
55. Weer v. State, 29 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787 (1941).
56. State ex rel. Demers v. Miami Circuit Court, 249 Ind. 616, 233 N.E. 2d 777 (1968).
57. Under the proposal found in ABA STANDARDS § 2.3(c) "[a] defendant without
counsel should not be deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he has been advised
by the court of his right to a speedy trial and the effect of his consent."
58. See note 7 supra.
59. In State v. Hicks, 353 Mo. 950, 185 S.W.2d 650 (1945), a Missouri court adhered to
this view in discussing the purpose of that state's speedy trial statute.
60. 154 Ind. 450, 57 N.E. 106 (1900).
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prior to the adoption of CR 4. In Kuhn the defendant was released
on bail during the February term of 1895. After three subsequent
terms of that year had passed without trial, the defendant filed her
motion for discharge. The state claimed that discharge was not in
order, since it had appeared by counsel and demanded that the
judge set the cause for trial. The state further indicated that in
response to its demands, the trial judge had stated that: "[O]wing
to the crowded condition of the docket of the court, it would be
impossible to try the cause for want of time."'" The Indiana Supreme Court refused to apply the exception by affirming the trial
court's grant of discharge. The court held that the crowded docket
exception
meant that the defendant must, at least, be brought to trial
within such third term, and, if it turns out that the trial
cannot be completed within the term, it may continue to
completion beyond the term. 2
A more recent case involved the question of whether the provision contained in the predecessor statute, which excepted discharge
"where there was not sufficient time to try him [defendant] during
such terms,"63 applied where the trial court facilities were inadequate to allow a defendant's trial within three terms of court. In
Castle v. State 4 there had not been enough time to try the defendant within three terms of court because the trial court was obliged
to share the only courtroom suitable for jury trials with another
court. Holding this practice to be "not compatible with the orderly,
prompt and efficient administration of justice,"65 the Indiana Supreme Court said:
Needless to say, appellant should not be prejudiced by the
admitted facts appearing of record which show there was
not sufficient time to try his case during the third term of
court because of the court's practice of dividing its courtroom facilities with another court. The accused's right to a
trial speedily and without delay is certainly meaningless if
it can be thwarted by the failure of the county commission61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 452, 57 N.E. at 107.
See note 22 supra.
237 Ind. 83, 143 N.E.2d 570 (1957).
Id. at 87, 143 N.E.2d at 572.
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ers to provide the necessary amenities which are a prerequisite to the running of an efficient court. 6
The reason for the court's holding is particularly enlightening:
For an accused to be entitled to discharge under the statute, it is immaterial whose act caused the delay, unless the
delay was caused by the accused. 7
Although these two cases were decided under the statute which
preceded CR 4, the holdings present compelling arguments for excluding a crowded court calendar exception from the present rule.
While the earlier statute did not explicitly contain a "crowded court
docket" exception, it did allow for delay "where there was not sufficient time to try him [defendant] during such terms." The language of this third listed exception might easily have been interpreted to include the congested court calendar condition contained
in CR 4. Courts deciding the earlier cases were correct in refraining
from such an interpretation.
It is apparent from the recent decision in Harrisv. State" that
the potential injustice to a defendant resulting from the third listed
exception of the present discharge rule cannot be easily avoided, nor
will it disappear by means of judicial disapproval. The defendant
in Harris made a motion for discharge after having been detained
in jail for over six months. Trial had been set beyond the six-month
deadline, and the trial judge "indicated that the delay was necessary due to his busy trial schedule." 6 9 The supreme court held that
discharge had been properly denied, saying that it was clear that
"one circumstance, recognized by the rule, excusing trial within the
six month period is where the trial docket is congested and trial
cannot be had within the time allotted." ' " The decision reached in
Harris was the only one possible under the present discharge rule.
To be internally consistent, however, CR 4's operation should not
be thwarted by this exception. A defendant who has not himself
caused the delay of his trial should not be denied a discharge on the
fortuitous basis that the jurisdiction in which he is being held has a
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id., 143 N.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 86, 143 N.E.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
256 Ind. 464, 269 N.E.2d 537 (1971).
Id. at 466, 269 N.E.2d at 538.
Id. at 468, 269 N.E.2d at 539 (emphasis added).
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crowded court docket. His "right to a trial speedily and without
delay is certainly meaningless if it can be thwarted by failure" 7 ' of
that jurisdiction to provide sufficient judicial machinery to avoid
excessive delay. CR 4 should be further amended to exclude the
crowded court docket exception.
If this exception were deleted from CR 4, as suggested, it is
possible that the judicial machinery of jurisdictions with especially
overcrowded dockets would require major alterations.72 It is also
possible that in those jurisdictions, prior to the creation of a more
adequate system to handle the volume of criminal cases, many defendants would be discharged. The result of this might be an increase in public pressure for improvement, hopefully followed by an
increase in governmental spending to provide the necessary judicial
reform.7 3 By providing the impetus for such action, the abolition of
the crowded court calendar exception could ultimately bring Indiana one step closer to the optimum system-a system which would
operate so efficiently within CR 4 standards that no discharge would
ever be necessary.
COUNTING

CR 4

TIME

Prior to the 1974 amendments, a major problem presented by
CR 4 cases was the manner in which the rule's time periods were to
be determined. There are two aspects of this problem which deserve
consideration: (1) following a delay caused by a defendant, whether
by a requested continuance or some other act, does the time referred
to in CR 4 merely resume counting or must it begin to run anew?;
(2) where the defendant acts in such a way that he is charged, for
CR 4 purposes, with the delay of his trial, and the result of his act
is a longer delay than he could foresee, or have reason to foresee,
should he be charged with the entire delay, or only a reasonable
portion thereof?
71. Castle v. State, 237 Ind. 83, 87, 143 N.E.2d 570, 573 (1957).
72. In United States ex rel. Frizer v. Mann, 437 F.2d 1312, 1315-16 (2d Cir. 1971), Chief
Judge Lombard, referring to the chronic congestion of New York criminal courts and realizing
the apparency of the "egregious failure on the part of numerous public officials to anticipate
the problems and to adopt measures necessary for their solution or their easing," indicated
his conviction "that the continuance of this situation cannot excuse denial of due process
rights in any particular case where a defendant has not been a party to the delay." Id. at
1315-16.
73. Id. at 1316. See also E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE COURTS 79
(1971).
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Resume Counting or Begin Anew?
Indiana courts interpreted the pre-amendment CR 4 to mean
that after a delay chargeable to the defendant "the time begins to
run anew." 74 The state supreme court first addressed this problem
in State v. Mabrey,75 in which two defendants were charged with a
crime and released on the first day of the 1922 September term of
the Lawrence Circuit Court. According to the discharge statute then
in effect, they were not to be held without a trial for a period embracing more than three terms of court, not including the 1922 September term, during which a recognizance was first taken. On the
fifth judicial day of the 1922 November term the defendants filed
motions for a change of venue. These motions were sustained and
venue was changed to the Monroe Circuit Court. The defendants'
causes were repeatedly continued on the trial court's own motions.
On October 6, the twenty-fourth judicial day of the 1923 September
term of the Monroe Circuit Court, the defendants filed petitions for
discharge, claiming that the November, February and April terms
had elapsed. The trial court sustained the petitions for discharge
and the state appealed."
In reversing the trial court, the Indiana Supreme Court held
that "[tihe three terms of court, as contemplated by the statute,
had not elapsed."7 7 The court said that the delay caused by the
defendants' venue motions
stopped the running of the time of the three terms of
limitation, until, by law, the causes would stand for trial in
the new jurisdiction. . . . The term of limitation began to
run at the beginning of the February term, 1923, and continued through the April term . . . and the September
term. . . The court had until the end of the third term
(September term, 1923) to try the causes.78
This view of term time, which cancelled all time spent awaiting trial
before the delay, was not limited to cases involving a change of
venue. The interpretation by which defendant's time under the pre74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

State v. Grow, 255 Ind. 183, 191, 263 N.E.2d 274, 278 (1970).
199 Ind. 276, 157 N.E. 97 (1927).
Id. at 277-78, 157 N.E. at 97.
Id. at 280, 157 N.E. at 98.
Id. at 279, 157 N.E. at 98.
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amendment rule was required to begin anew also applied to delays
caused by motions for change of judge,79 motions for continuance,,"
motions for severance,"' appeals 2 and requests for new attorneys. 3
In Summerlin v. State 4 a defendant was indicted and incarcerated on June 10, 1969. Over four months later, on October 23, his
attorney withdrew from the case at the defendant's request. The
court appointed a new attorney on November 12, 1969. Some time
prior to February 25, 1970, the defendant filed a timely motion for
discharge. Although eight and one half months had expired from the
time of the defendant's imprisonment, and the delay caused by the
appointment of a new attorney covered only twenty days, the
Summerlin court denied the defendant's discharge. In support of its
decision that the four month period spent in jail prior to October
23 was cancelled, the Summerlin court said:
The rule is for the benefit of the defendant and any action
which he initiates which would obstruct the speedy trial
process should cause the time to start anew since it is then
apparent that defendant no longer wishes to avail himself
of the benefit. 5
79. Weer v. State, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787 (1941).
80. Morrow v. State, 245 Ind. 242, 196 N.E.2d 408, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 864 (1964).
81. State v. Hawley, 256 Ind. 244, 268 N.E.2d 80 (1971).
82. State ex rel. Walker v. Ratliff, 253 Ind. 495, 255 N.E.2d 223 (1970). In Martin v.
State, 245 Ind. 224, 231, 194 N.E.2d 721, 724 (1963), after the defendant had one conviction
reversed, the prosecutor filed a motion for a change of judge. The trial court denied the motion
and the state appealed. During the interim, the statutory time elapsed without any action
taken in the trial court. In subsequently denying discharge of the defendant the Indiana
Supreme Court held that
the terms of court involved are those of the trial court, and the responsibility for
bringing the action to trial is thrust upon the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge,
neither of whom could exercise any control over the judicial process in this court.
Id. at 231, 194 N.E.2d at 724. Although the court declared this position "is supported by the
clear language of the statute," the statute is anything but clear on this problem. In fact, the
decision raises a very basic question of the relation of the statute to the constitutional mandate that "justice shall be administered . . . speedily, and without delay."
If it is assumed that the word "speedily" and the phrase "without delay" are not redundant expressions, what content does the statute pour into these words? If the statute assures
the defendant that his case will be brought to trial "without delay," does it also assure him
that the final disposition of that case will occur "speedily"? While under the fact situation
of the Martin case the defendant had already received a trial, albeit not one free from error,
query what protection is afforded an accused whose trial has not received a final disposition.
83. Summerlin v. State, 256 Ind. 652, 271 N.E.2d 411 (1971).
84. 256 Ind. 652, 271 N.E.2d 411 (1971).
85. Id. at 666, 271 N.E.2d at 418.
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This statement is erroneous in its sweeping generality. As a justification for the "begin anew" interpretation of CR 4 time, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the rule. The rule exists to insure the
defendant that he will receive a trial within the specified time period.80 The operation of the rule remains in effect regardless of
whether or not the defendant relishes the thought of trial.87 In all
cases, a concerted effort should be made to hold trial within that
specified period. If this cannot be done because of delay caused by
the defendant, the feasibility of succeeding in the attempt is decreased-not to the extent of an entire additional time period (for
example, six months), but simply by the amount of time consumed
by the delay.
Defendants often make various motions in criminal proceedings
pursuant to their right to a fair trial. Thus, the defendant in Easton
v. State,8" denied a discharge because of the delay caused by his
motion for change of judge, argued that to "charge him with the
delay requires him to elect between his constitutional guarantees of
a speedy trial and a trial by an unbiased court.""9 This election
between a speedy trial and a fair trial, forced by the "begin anew"
interpretation, was the primary evil resulting from that interpretation.'"
A defendant who has awaited trial for a number of months and
who subsequently discovers the necessity of making some "delaying" motion to preserve his right to a fair trial no longer has to forfeit
all CR 4 time. The Indiana Supreme Court, in its recent amendments to the rule, undoubtedly recognized the chilling effect this
forfeiture created on such motions-and utimately on the fair trial
of the defendant. The specified time period in CR 4 is now extended
only by the time consumed in delays caused by the defendant's
act.'
86. Randolph v. State, 234 Ind. 57, 63, 122 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1954).
87. ABA STANDARDS § 2.2. The commentary states that
the trial of a criminal case should not be unreasonably delayed merely because the
defendant does not think it is in his best interest to seek prompt disposition of the
charge. Comment at 17.
88.
__ Ind. -,
280 N.E.2d 307 (1972).
89. Id. at -,
280 N.E.2d at 308.
90. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), wherein the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions" is developed.
91. See note 14 supra.
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Entire Delay or Reasonable Portion?
In extending CR 4's deadlines by only that time which results
from the defendant's acts, the amendments have brought the rule's
operation into closer harmony with its purpose. The Indiana Supreme Court is to be commended for effecting these changes in CR
4's provisions. Despite the elimination of the former "begin anew"
interpretation, however, the amended application of CR 4 provides
inadequate protection to a defendant if the length of the delay bears
no reasonable relation to the act from which it originated.
The facts in State v. Grow12 illustrate this inadequacy. The
defendant therein moved for a change of venue from the judge. In
the two succeeding panels named by the presiding judge the nominee failed to qualify. The special judge finally appointed by the
Indiana Supreme Court did not qualify until six months from the
time the defendant filed his motion. The supreme court decided
that the rule's time period did not beginrunning until the slecial
judge had been qualified.93 In his brief, the defendant correctly analyzed the situation:
From the facts and records in this case, the resulting delay
following the appellee's motion for a change of judge cannot
be said to have arisen by the reason of the defendant's filing
of such motion for a change of venue from the judge, and
certainly the defendant in the instant case should not be
held responsible for, nor be required to, predict that there
would be such delays as there was [sic] in the trial of this
cause as a result of the action of defendant herein moving
for a change of venue.94
A further illustration of the inequities which result from counting rule time as the court did in the Grow case is demonstrated in
Wedmore v. State.9 5 The defendant in Wedmore also requested and
was granted a change of judge. Following a two-year delay, it was
determined that the special judge had not qualified. The defendant
92. 255 Ind. 183, 263 N.E.2d 277 (1970).
93. Id. at 185, 263 N.E.2d at 278.
94. Brief for Appellee at 13, State v. Grow, 255 Ind. 183, 200, 263 N.E.2d 277, 285 (1970)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
95. 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957).
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filed a motion for discharge two years and three months after his
original motion. The state supreme court held that this twentyseven month delay would not be counted under the discharge statute."
Appellant, by his request for a change of judge, set in motion the chain of events which caused the delay in his trial.
This delay was caused by his acts, hence he is not entitled
to a discharge.97
This reasoning is inconsistent with the purpose of CR 4. To hold the
defendant responsible for delays which were beyond his control and
which he had no reason to foresee is contrary to the speedy trial
which CR 4 seeks to ensure. While it may be difficult to decide at
what point in time a delay which was initiated by the defendant
ceases to remain a defendant-caused delay and begins to acquire all
the characteristics of a delay caused by the trial court, justice demands that that decision be attempted.
Judge DeBruler recognized this necessity in his dissenting opinion in the case of State v. Hawley." An issue in Hawley was a threemonth period during which the trial court delayed a ruling on the
defendant's motion for a separate trial. The trial court allowed discharge, but the supreme court reversed the decision, saying that this
was a delay "to which delaying time he [defendant] was not entitled to credit."9 In dissent, Judge DeBruler asserted that the entire
period of three months should not have been attributed to the filing
of a motion for severance:
The only part of this period properly attributed to the motion is that time necessary for trial court to rule on the
motion, and the remainder of the delay would not be caused
by the pending motion. In this case, the trial court stated
that he was delaying the ruling on the motion for the reason
that the co-defendant had entered a plea of insanity. Such
a turn of events is obviously no responsibility of the appellee.1°n
96. 1967 Op. Arr'y GEN. IND. 371, 375 (discussion of facts not contained in Wedmore
opinion).
97. 237 Ind. 212, 216, 143 N.E.2d 649, 651. See also Ward v. State, 246 Ind. 374, 205
N.E.2d 148 (1965).
98. 256 Ind. 244, 268 N.E.2d 80 (1971).
99. Id. at 251, 268 N.E.2d at 83.
100. Id. at 252, 268 N.E.2d at 84.
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The suggestion which followed in Judge DeBruler's dissent
merits serious consideration:
In my opinion, ten days would constitute a reasonable period for the trial court to study the motion, hear arguments,
if necessary, and rule on the motion. I would, therefore,
consider the delay from . . . the end of such ten day period
• . . as delay not caused by the act of the appellee.'"'
This limitation would not require a trial court to make its ruling
within ten days. It would simply dictate, for purposes of counting
CR 4 time, that delay following the ten-day deadline would be
treated as delay of the defendant's trial not "caused by his act." The
ten-day limitation could be extended to all of the ordinary motions
made by defendants in criminal trials..'" 2 A similar forty-day limitation could be applied to the counting of rule time when appeals are
taken.' Such limitations would eliminate the inequitable practice
of charging defendants with inordinate delays of which they were
only technically the instigators.
DEFENDANTS INCARCERATED ON ANOTHER CHARGE

A related time-counting problem under CR 4 is whether the
rule's stated periods should be determined differently for those defendants in jail for multiple offenses. The recent amendments failed
to meet the question of whether the fact of the defendant's custody
on another charge tolls the running of the time within which CR 4
requires his trial on a new charge.
The state supreme court first addressed itself to this question
in Palmer v. State.'0 4 In that case an indictment ws returned against
101. Id.
102. Certain motions might require a somewhat longer limitation. For example, sanity
hearings would probably require a limitation exceeding ten days. See United States v. Dunn,
459 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
103. A limitation on appeal time seems to be necessary because CR 4 time is not
counted while a defendant's case is being appealed. In State ex rel. Walker v. Ratliff, 253
Ind. 495, 255 N.E.2d 223 (1970), a defendant was arrested in March of 1967 and tried in July
of that year. He appealed his conviction and in November of 1968 a new trial was ordered.
In February of 1969, 23 months after his arrest, the defendant filed a motion for discharge.
The Indiana Supreme Court denied discharge saying
[iut would be unrealistic for this Court to hold that time required for the perfection
of his (defendant's) appeal would be charged against the state and upon return of
tte cause to the trial court that court would be required to discharge the defendant
by reason of the expiration of time.
Id. at 498, 255 N.E.2d at 224.
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the defendant in Owen county while he was incarcerated in a different county on conviction of an unrelated charge. Over six months
later, the Owen county sheriff arrested the defendant and transferred him to the Owen county jail. Having remained in jail two full
terms following the return of the indictment, the defendant claimed
he was entitled to discharge. The Palmer court rejected the defendant's argument, saying that the time the defendant was in custody
on the different offense was not to be counted for discharge purposes
toward the Owen county indictment.'"5
Over forty years after the Palmer decision, the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the question of the speedy trial rights of
prisoners held by another jurisdiction in the case of Smith v.
Hooey.'°0 The accused in that case was being held in a federal prison
in Kansas in 1960, at which time he was indicted upon a theft charge
in Texas. Shortly thereafter, the petitioner requested a speedy trial
on the Texas charge. He was notified that a trial would be afforded
him any time within two weeks of the date he could be present in
Texas. The authorities in Texas, however, made no effort to obtain
the petitioner's presence, and his repeated demands for trial continued for six years.0 7 In refusing Smith's mandamus action to dismiss
the indictment, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed an earlier
holding'" ' based on reasoning similar to that used by the Indiana
Supreme Court in Palmer. The United States Supreme Court held
that "Texas had a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith
effort to bring him for trial."''0 9 The Court suggested four compelling
reasons for protecting the speedy trial rights of a defendant already
in prison under another sentence. First, the chances of a defendant
incarcerated on a prior conviction to serve his sentences concurrently are diminished if his second trial is delayed. Second, the
pendency of a second charge may increase the duration of the first
sentence and worsen the conditions under which it must be served.
Third, the anxiety, uncertainty and concern accompanying the sec104. 198 Ind. 73, 152 N.E. 607 (1926).
105. Id.
106. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
107. Id. at 375.
108. Cooper v. State, 400 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1966). In referring to a defendant's speedy
trial rights, the Cooper court said that "despite some cases holding to the contrary, it appears
that a different rule is applicable when two sovereignties are involved." Id. at 891.
109. 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969).
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ond charge have a chilling effect on efforts for rehabilitation and
self-improvement. Fourth, incarceration seriously limits a defendant in his efforts to mount an adequate defense."'
Smith was cited by the Indiana Supreme Court in Fossey v.
State."' In Fossey the defendant was awaiting trial on a state charge
while serving a sentence imposed as a result of a federal conviction.
Two years after the prosecution had filed its affidavit, the defendant
was still awaiting trial on the state charge. By denying the defendant's discharge claim, the Fossey court failed to give full effect to
the Smith decision. In discussing the prospective application that
was to be given to Smith, the court in Fossey only indicated a
recognition "that there is now a constitutional obligation imposed
upon the states to make, upon demand of an incarcerated
defendant, a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him to trial.""' Although the defendant in the Smith case made repeated demands for
trial, that factor should not be determinative in deciding the validity of a CR 4(A) claim. Thus, Smith v. Hooey should be read as
eliminating the distinction, for CR 4 purposes, between a defendant
in jail on a prior conviction and an accused concerned only with a
trial on one pending charge."' The Fossey court erred in retaining
the requirement of a demand. Having realized that
the standard imposed on Indiana courts and prosecutors is
stricter than that imposed in the federal system since any
delay exceeding the specified time limit is considered a per
se denial of the "speedy trial" right,"'
the court in Fossey seemed to ignore the stricter standard established by CR 4.1
All Indiana cases decided after Fossey have required defendants incarcerated on prior offenses to make a demand for trial
before affording them CR 4's protection."' In light of the four considerations given in the Smith case emphasizing the urgency of
110. Id. at 378-79.
111. 254 Ind. 173, 258 N.E.2d 616 (1970).
112. Id. at 181, 258 N.E.2d at 620.
113. But see Smeltzer v. State, 254 Ind. 165, 171, 258 N.E.2d 647, 650 (1970).
114. Fossey v. State, 254 Ind. 173, 179, 258 N.E.2d 616, 619 (1970).
115. See notes 133-36 infra and accompanying text.
116. Hart v. State, - Ind. -, 292 N.E.2d 814 (1973); Napiwocki v. State, 257 Ind.
32, 272 N.E.2d 865 (1971); Smeltzer v. State, 254 Ind. 165, 258 N.E.2d 647 (1970).
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protecting the speedy trial interests of these defendants," 7 this requirement can only be justified in the event that a demand requirement is considered a condition precedent to discharge for all Indiana
criminal defendants, including those not serving sentences imposed
for prior convictions.
DEMAND REQUIREMENTS UNDER

CR 4

There are two distinct types of "demand" to consider in
conjunction with CR 4. The first type is a demand for discharge
prior to the trial. The second type is a demand for trial. While the
former type is compatible with the rule's purposes in some circumstances, a requirement of the latter type is contrary to that purpose
and well-reasoned case law.
Demand for Discharge
In Randolph v. State"' the difference between the two kinds of
"demand" was recognized and clarified. The defendant in that case
was brought to trial beyond the statutory time limit. He had not
asked for a trial, and he attempted to invoke the discharge statute
for the first time after the conviction. The Randolph court said that
under the discharge statute there was "no burden upon the defendant to request a speedy trial.""' 9 Distinct from the demand for trial,
however, is the demand for discharge. The court felt that a different
requirement of the defendant attached to this kind of demand:
[I]f the terms of court specified in the statute go by and
he is, through no fault of his own, not brought to trial, the
burden of invoking the statute then falls upon him and his
rights thereunder can be asserted only through some affirmative action on his part.' 0
Because the holding in Randolph is based on the concept of
waiver,'' it is necessary to examine the possible reasons that a defendant might have for failing to move for a discharge prior to trial.
It is submitted that the majority of such cases falls into one of two
117. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1969).
118. 234 Ind. 57, 122 N.E.2d 860 (1954).
119. Id. at 65, 122 N.E.2d at 864.
120. Id. at 67, 122 N.E.2d at 865; accord, Durrett v. State, 247 Ind. 692, 694, 219 N.E.2d
814, 815 (1966); In re Brooks, 247 Ind. 249, 250, 214 N.E.2d 653, 654 (1966); Callahan v. State,
247 Ind. 350, 356, 214 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1966).
121. Randolph v. State, 234 Ind. 57, 73, 122 N.E.2d 860, 868 (1954).
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categories: (1) the defendant is convinced that he would be acquitted at his trial, and prefers acquittal to discharge, or (2) the defendant or his counsel failed to make a motion prior to trial because of

lack of knowledge of the opportunity to do

S0.122

It is submitted that the majority of defendants who fail to seek
discharge prior to trial, even though entitled to such discharge, do
so because they are unaware that such an option is open to them.
The rule in Randolph, as applied to these defendants, would be
subject to question. Chief Justice Gilkinsan, in his dissenting opinion in Randolph, expressed his concern over the fact that "[tihe
opinion labors to justify its indulgence in a presumption that by
mere silence the defendant waived his unquestioned right to discharge for the state's delay in bringing him to trial.' ' 23 The chief
justice went on to observe that "[w]here fundamental constitutional rights are involved, waiver cannot be assumed under any
circumstances, especially when human liberty is at issue. 12 4 To be
consistent with this constitutional analysis of waiver, the rule in
Randolph should be confined to those cases in which a conscious
choice was made not to seek discharge prior to trial.
The problem inherent in a selective application of the
Randolph rule is in determining whether the waiver of the right to
discharge was knowingly made. Yet to require that the discharge
demand must be raised before trial in all cases penalizes certain
defendants. As a result, the general rule should be that the right to
discharge is not deemed to be waived by failure to raise the issue at
the trial level. The obvious objection to allowing this issue to be
raised for the first time on appeal is that a defendant could then go
to trial in hopes of an acquittal, but if convicted, allege that the trial
should never have been held at all. '2 5 Realistically, however, this
would rarely occur. Most defendants, if given the choice, would
prefer discharge to the risk involved in going to trial on a criminal
charge. Allowing this practice to the few who might take such a risk
is a relatively small price to pay. While it might add to the workload
122. Easton v. State, - Ind. -, 280 N.E.2d 307 (1972); see In re Brooks, 247 Ind.
249, 251, 214 N.E.2d 653, 654 (1966); Callahan v. State, 247 Ind. 350, 356, 214 N.E.2d 648,
651 (1966).
123. Randolph v. State, 234 Ind. 57, 73, 122 N.E.2d 860, 868 (1954).
124. Id. at 74, 122 N.E.2d at 869.
125. Callahan v. State, 247 Ind. 350, 214 N.E.2d 648 (1966).
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of state appeals courts, it would protect those defendants who either
had no knowledge of CR 4 or were represented by incompetent counsel.
Demand for Trial
The rule requiring a defendant to demand trial in order to be
entitled to discharge was judicially abolished in 1951 in Zehrlaut v.
State.' The discharge statute changes in 1965, retained in the 1974
amendments, further evidence the abolition of the requirement for
28
this type of demand.' 27 A recent Indiana Supreme Court decision,
however, has raised doubt over the status of the demand for trial
requirement as it relates to CR 4. This necessitates a re-examination
of the "demand-waiver" rule.
The "demand-waiver" rule was explained by the Indiana Supreme Court in State v. Beckwith.'2 In considering "what action
must be taken by the accused to avail himself of the right to a
dismissal because of delay,"' 30 the Beckwith court thought that "a
demand for trial, resistance to postponement, or some other effort
to secure a speedy trial on the part of the accused"' 31 should be
shown. Addressing itself to the waiver aspect, the court in Beckwith
said:
[I]t would seem that the constitutional right should be
deemed waived by the failure to ask for trial, the silent
acquiescence in the delay, and the failure to claim the constitutional right until the cause had been definitely set for
trial upon the request of the state, and then only by a
32
motion to dismiss.
This portion of the Beckwith opinion was expressly overruled,
however, in Zehrlaut v.State. 33 In Zehrlaut the Indiana Supreme
Court re-examined the demand-waiver rule. Realizing that the statute casts the burden upon "the state and its officers, the trial courts
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951).
IND. R. CRiM. P. 4(B).
Bryant v. State, Ind. -, 301 N.E.2d 179 (1973).
222 Ind. 618, 57 N.E.2d 193 (1944).
Id. at 629, 57 N.E.2d at 198.
Id.
Id., quoting State v. Miller, 72 Wash. 154, 156, 129 P. 1100, 1101 (1913).
230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951).
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and prosecuting attorneys"'34 to bring the defendant to trial within
the time stated, the court declared:
[I]t is not a fault of the defendant if he remain silent while
under recognizance, on the contrary, that is his right. He
is not requiredto make any demand of the state or the court
for a speedy trial. That demand is made for him by the
constitution and its implementing statute.'35
The Zehrlaut opinion firmly established the rejection of the rule
that an accused must demand a speedy trial. Indeed, the case was
cited by the United States Supreme Court as standing for Indiana's
rejection of this kind of demand rule.'36
However, a question as to the status of the rule at the present
time has been raised by a recent Indiana Supreme Court decision.
In Bryant v. State'37 the case of a defendant awaiting trial was
docketed in the Marshall Circuit Court subsequent to a change of
venue. Some time later a trial date which was twelve days beyond
the rule's six-month deadline was selected. Since the record of the
trial court did not reflect the presence of either the defendant or her
counsel at the time the case was set for trial, the Indiana Supreme
Court assumed that neither participated in the choice of the trial
date. Six months expired without any delays attributable to the
defendant. When the time had elapsed, but prior to the trial's
commencement, the defendant made a motion to discharge. 38The
trial court overruled the motion; the supreme court affirmed.
An examination of the facts in Bryant indicates that the defendant had satisfied her demand requirement. That is, she made a
demand for a discharge prior to trial. If a further "demand" were
to be required of her at all, it would have to be the "demand for
trial" which was rejected in Zehrlaut.3 9 The court in Bryant held,
however, that the defendant's "failure to object" to the date set for
trial "must be regarded as acquiescence therein and a waiver of the
134. Id. at 183, 102 N.E.2d at 207.
135. Id. (emphasis added); accord, Durrett v. State, 247 Ind. 692, 694, 219 N.E.2d 814,
815 (1966).
136. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 524 n.21 (1972).
301 N.E.2d 179 (1973).
137. __ Ind138. Id. at _, 301 N.E.2d at 180.
139. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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right to discharge.""'4 The case appears to have been decided incorrectly for two reasons. First, since the defendant's "failure to object"
is tantamount to a failure to demand trial, the Bryant court seems
to be reinstating the "demand-waiver" rule. If so, this reinstatement is difficult to justify, since the Bryant court realized that
under CR 4 the "[defendant was entitled to be brought to trial
within six months, and she was not required to take affirmative
steps to obtain a trial within that period."'' Certainly, demanding
a different trial date is an "affirmative step" which the defendant
"was not required to take."'' 2 Second, since the decision is in direct
conflict with the holding in Zehrlaut v. State, it seems strange that
the court in Bryant makes no mention of the Zehrlaut case.' By
failing to do so, the Bryant decision raises unnecessary doubts concerning the "demand-waiver" doctrine in Indiana.
It is believed that these doubts can be resolved by a careful
reading of CR 4. Part (B) of the rule deals specifically with the
procedure in cases where a defendant does demand an early trial.'4
In such cases, a defendant "shall be discharged if not brought to
trial within fifty (50) judicial days from the date of such motion."'
To read the demand-waiver doctrine into CR 4(A) is to give part (B)
little or no effect. Once a demand for trial is made, part (B) governs.
Part (A) relates to cases in which a demand was not made; it necessarily negates the "waiver" idea, and only requires that the defendant either be tried within one year or be discharged.'48
140.
__ Ind. at ___, 301 N.E.2d at 180.
141. Id.
142. In Utterback v. State, __
Ind. App.
-, 300 N.E.2d 688 (1973), under facts
similar to those in Bryant, the court said that a defendant need not
familiarize the prosecutor and the courts with critical procedures. It is the responsibility of the state to prosecute and prosecute properly. The appellant need not provide the instructional manual for the construction of his prison cell.
Id. at _, 300 N.E.2d at 689.
143. The court in Bryant relied on the cases which had been expressly overruled in
Zehrlaut. See Chelf v. State, 233 Ind. 70, 58 N.E.2d 353 (1944); State v. Beckwith, 222 Ind.
618, 57 N.E.2d 193 (1944).
144. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
145. IND. R. CRIM. P. 4(B).
146. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), wherein the United States Supreme
Court refused to find waiver of an absolute right absent a competent, knowing and intelligent
waiver of this right by the accused. Although this case dealt with the right to counsel in
federal courts by virtue of the sixth amendment, it presents a strong analogy in deciding
whether a defendant has waived CR 4 rights.
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Once a demand for discharge has been made, it is the responsibility of the trial court to determine the validity of the defendant's
claim.' 47 Such determination depends upon whether or not the delay
in the trial is due to some act of the defendant. Indiana courts have
traditionally given the defendant the burden (the risk of nonpersuasion) on this issue. If this practice is tobe retained, it should
at least be modified by shifting the burden of going forward with the
evidence to the prosecution after a defendant has established a
prima facie case for discharge. The case cited repeatedly as dispositive of the issue of who should bear the burden of proof in a discharge claim is Sullivan v. State.' In that case, a dispute arose
concerning which party requested a continuance. After listening to
conflicting evidence at a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied discharge and the defendant appealed. The Indiana Supreme
Court affirmed, stating what has since been referred to as the
Sullivan rule:'49 "A defendant must show that the delay complained
of was caused by the state and not by him."' 5 Since CR 4 itself does
not expressly allocate the burden of proof on the issue of delay, a
court's view of the rule's purpose becomes crucial to the way the
Sullivan rule will be applied.
A court which sees CR 4's purpose as prodding the prosecutor
will apply the Sullivan rule so that a defendant will be required to
show a delay caused by the prosecutor. Such a showing actually
involves two aspects of proof. A defendant would have to present
affirmative evidence that it was the state which initiated the delay
in his trial. He would further be required to demonstrate that he did
not participate in that delay. If, however, the court adhered to the
view that CR 4 exists primarily to bring non-delaying defendants to
trial, then at most a defendant would have to prove that he did not
cause the delay. This approach merely interprets the Sullivan rule
to require a defendant to raise the discharge issue and establish a
prima facie case. The defendant could meet this burden by alleging
and proving that he was held in jail or under recognizance, without
147. McGuire v. Wallace, 109 Ind. 284, 288, 10 N.E.2d 111, 113 (1887).
148. 215 Ind. 343, 19 N.E.2d 739 (1939).
149. Johnson v. State, 252 Ind. 79, 87, 246 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1969).
150. 215 Ind. 343, 347, 19 N.E.2d 739, 741 (emphasis added); accord, Norris v. State,
251 Ind. 155, 163, 240 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1968).
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trial, for a time period exceeding that provided in CR 4. A prima
facie case established, the burden of going forward with evidence on
the issue of the cause of delay would then shift to the state. To avoid
discharge, the state would then be compelled to prove a viable exception to the rule's operation.
To determine whether or not the present practice of relieving
the prosecutor of this burden at CR 4 hearings is justifiable, certain
basic criminal concepts of policy and fairness must be emphasized.' 5' If the entire burden of proof (risk of nonpersuasion and
burden of producing the evidence) were determined on"the basis of
the pleadings themselves, the defendant should carry that burden.
Wigmore points out that the burden is often placed "upon the party
having the affirmative allegation."' 52 Wigmore immediately adds,
however, that "this is not an invariable test, nor even always a
significant circumstance. ' 1 13 There exist compelling reasons, in a
hearing on a CR 4 motion, which counterbalance the tendency to
place the entire burden on the defendant.
A defendant's proof in his claim for discharge often depends
exclusively on what the court records indicate.'54 If these records are
not properly kept, a defendant may be effectively denied discharge
solely on this basis.'55 This unnecessry prejudice to a defendant
could be avoided by shifting the burden of going forward with the
evidence to the prosecution. Another factor to consider is whether
the defendant should be required to prove a ngative.5 6 Unless the
burden is shifted to the prosecutor, a defendant is forced to
demonstrate that of all the many possible reasons for the delay in
his trial, none of these include his own acts.'57 If the burden is
shifted, the prosecutor would not be required to prove that the state
did not cause the delay, since the rule requires discharge unless the
delay was caused by the defendant.
151.
152.

C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 789 (2d ed. 1972).
4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (2d ed. 1905).

153. Id.
154. Norris v. State, 251 Ind. 155, 163, 240 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1968); Harbaugh v. State,
234 Ind. 420, 425, 126 N.E.2d 576, 578 (1955); State v. Beckwith, 222 Ind. 618, 625, 57 N.E.2d
193, 196 (1944).

155. State v. Gardner, 237 Ind. 557, 559, 122 N.E.2d 77, 78 (1954).
156. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (2d ed. 1905).
157. Harbaugh v. State, 234 Ind. 420, 426, 126 N.E.2d 576, 579 (1955); Barker v. State,
188 Ind. 263, 265, 120 N.E.2d 593, 594 (1918).
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In addition to the policy reasons and considerations of fairness
developed above, the allocation of the burden to the state in
discharge disputes finds support in the first reported case which
involved the statute. In McGuire v. 14.ullace,' 51 the Indiana Supreme
Court stipulated that "[a]s long and as often as the State is able
to make it appear that the occasion of the delay is one of the excepted causes, the application must fail."' 59 The converse was also
held to be true: if the state could not establish a delay occasioned
by the defendant, assuming the requisite number of terms had expired, the defendant's application would result in his discharge.' 0
This early interpretation of the statute is sound. It recognizes the
extent of protection to which a defendant is entitled under the discharge statute. If trial is delayed beyond the specified time, the only
exceptions to discharge will be those listed in the statute. The interpretaton in McGuire avoids the danger inherent in the Sullivan
rule-that an additional exception might be added whereby a bona
fide claim for discharge would be overruled merely because the
defendant failed to prove its validity.'6 '
Presumptions also affect the determination of whether the burden should be shifted to the prosecution. In dealing with a defendant's motion to discharge which had presented questions of fact
relative to the cause of the delay of the trial, the supreme court in
State v. McGuire said, "Both the State and the accused were entitled to be heard upon this investigation. The presumptions were in
favor of the accused."'' 2 By its operation, the Sullivan rule dictates
the presumption that the delay in the defendant's trial was caused
by his own act. Deciding which presumption should be adopted
essentially involves one question: if there is doubt as to the cause
of the delay in the defendant's trial, how should CR 4 be construed
to resolve that doubt? The Indiana Supreme Court has repeatedly
indicated that "[t]he discharge statute is to be so construed that
158. 109 Ind. 284, 10 N.E. ll (1887).
159. Id. at 288, 10 N.E. at 113 (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. Stokes v. State, __ Ind. App...
-,
. 299 N.E.2d 647, 649 (1973).
162. McGuire v. Wallace, 109 Ind. 284, 288, 10 N.E. 111, 113 (1887) (emphasis added).
A possible explanation for this can be seen in Alford v. State,
Ind. __,
294 N.E.2d 168
(1973): "Rules 4(A) and (B) refer only to defendants who are in jail awaiting trial and who
are, therefore, presumed innocent." Id. at __,
294 N.E.2d at 170.
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all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the accused."'' 3 If any practical effect is to be given to these words, then the burden of going
forward with the evidence on the cause of delay should not reside
with the defendant after he has established a prima facie case for
discharge. That burden should rest with the state.
CONCLUSION

The right to a speedy trial exists to protect criminal defendants
from the prejudice which follows a delay in the disposition of pending criminal charges. In general, CR 4 has operated satisfactorily in
alleviating prolonged imprisonment, the anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried criminal charge, and the hazard to
the defendant of a trial after prolonged delay.' 4 The recent amendments will increase the effectiveness of the rule. To more adequately
fulfill its purpose of bringing all defendants to trial within its specified time periods, however, a further amendment abolishing CR 4's
crowded docket exception is required.6 5 CR 4's purpose would best
be served by the retention of the "delay caused by the defendant's
act" exception only.
The manner in which rule time is counted when a defendant
does delay his own trial is also crucial to whether CR 4 will adequately achieve its function. In such a case, the rule as amended
now dictates that all time spent by defendant prior to his own act
which causes delay is to be counted towards the maximum time
within which he can be incarcerated or held on recognizance without
163. Castle v. State, 237 Ind. 83, 88, 143 N.E.2d 570, 572 (1957); see also Shewmaker
v. State, 236 Ind. 49, 53, 138 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1956); Colglazier v. State, 231 Ind. 571, 576,
110 N.E.2d 2, 4 (1953).
164. 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 242 (1965).
165. The proposal in the ABA STANDARDS § 2.3(b) asserts that general court congestion
is no excuse for noncompliance with the statutory time limits. It does recommend, however,
a provision excluding from computation of time limits "[tihe period of delay resulting from
congestion of the trial docket when the congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances." This provision is explained in the comments:
Although it is fair to expect the state to provide the machinery needed to dispose of
the usual business of the court promptly, it does not appear feasible to impose the
same requirements when certain unique, nonrecurring events have produced an inordinate number of cases for court disposition. Thus, when a large-scale riot or other
mass public disorder has occurred, some leeway for additional time is required to
ensure that the many resulting cases may receive adequate attention from the prosecutor's office, defense counsel (possibly a single defender office), and the judiciary.
Comment at 28.
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trial. The rule is silent, however, on the procedure to be followed in
gauging the actual length of time which can be said to proximately
result from a defendant's delaying act. An amendment definitively
relating designated periods of delay to various motions made by
defendants would be helpful for purposes of clarification. In the
interim before such possible amendment, a judicial interpretation
of the rule which credits a defendant with that portion of unforeseeable delay subsequent to his act is desirable.
The manner in which Indiana courts apply CR 4 to a discharge
claim made by a defendant incarcerated on a separate charge deserves thoughtful reconsideration. CR 4 does not expressly require
that a defendant in this category demand trial before he is protected
by CR 4 safeguards; by implication, subdivision (B) of the rule
negates such a construction for all Indiana criminal defendants.
Both CR 4 and the Indiana Constitution which it implements make
demands for trial on behalf of these defendants. As a result, the only
"demand" consideration which deserves attention in the CR 4(A)
hearing is whether demand for discharge was made prior to trial. If
such an inquiry is to be made, it should not focus on whether a
technical waiver exists, but whether that waiver was knowingly
made.
A final area in which CR 4's operation could be improved deals
with the delegation of the burden of establishing cause of delay at
CR 4 hearings. Indiana courts, with little or no opposition, have
required defendants to carry this burden. The present stance of
Indiana's judiciary should be modified if a defendant can establish
a prima facie case for discharge. By requiring the state to go forward
in the event the defendant displays a valid claim, no deserving
defendant will be denied discharge unless the delay is proven to
have been caused by his act.
If the amendments and differing interpretations suggested are
applied to CR 4, the rule's effectiveness in combating evils incident
to the denial of a speedy trial will improve. The 1974 amendments
have demonstrated an effort to obtain this goal. Further progress is
required, however, before every criminal defendant in Indiana is
provided with the speedy trial to which he is entitled.
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